

# **The Role of Arms Control for the European Security Order**

**– Erosion of Arms Control Arrangements –  
Can this Trend be Reversed?**

Wolfgang Richter

Colonel (ret.)

Senior Associate

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Berlin

# The Role of Arms Control for the European Security Order

## Structure of Presentation

- A. Clarification of Terms:  
Arms Control & European Security Order
- B. Security context: From the Cold War to Cooperation:  
Significance of Arms Control for overcoming confrontation
- C. New Crises and Conflict Potentials
- D. Erosion of Arms Control and Return of Confrontation ?
- E. Ways out of the Crisis – Revival of Arms Control?

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# The Role of Arms Control for the European Security Order

## Arms Control Purposes

### A. Implementing International Humanitarian Law

- **Prohibition of possession, production, transfer of WMD**
- **Prohibition of possession, production, transfer of or**
- **Limitation of the use of certain conventional weapons**

### B. Maintaining politico-military stability

- **Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons**
- **Assuring mutual deterrence through a balance of forces**
- **Eliminate or reduce military capabilities for aggression**
- **Predictability of military action to enable timely reaction**

# The Role of Arms Control for the European Security Order

## Arms Control Purposes

### A. Implementing International Humanitarian Law

- **Prohibition of possession, production, transfer of WMD**
  - **BTWC, CWC, (new: TPNW)**
- **Prohibition of possession, production, transfer of or**
- **Limitation of the use of certain conventional weapons**
  - **UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) with Protocols**
  - **Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines**
  - **Convention on the Prohibition of Cluster Munitions**

# The Role of Arms Control for the European Security Order

## Arms Control Purposes

### **B. Maintaining politico-military stability**

- **Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons**
  - Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
  - Partial / Comprehensive Testban Treaty (P/CTBT)
  - Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
- **Assuring mutual deterrence through a balance of forces**
  - SALT I/II, START I(II), SORT, New START (bilateral)
- **Eliminate or reduce military capabilities for aggression**
  - Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) (multilateral)
- **Predictability of military action to enable timely reaction**
  - Vienna Document on Confidence & Security-Building Measures (CSBM)

# The Role of Arms Control for the European Security Order

## Arms Control Key Terms

- **Disarmament, Arms Control, Nonproliferation**
- **Subjects to Agreements: Definitions**
- **Prohibition** e.g. **INF-Treaty, WMD**
- **Limitation & Reduction** e.g. **CFE-Treaty**
- **Transparency – Verification** e.g. **OS-Treaty, Vienna Doc.**
- **Legally binding treaties, conventions** e.g. **INF, CFE, OS, DPA**
- **Political documents and Code of Conducts** e.g. **Vienna Doc.**
- **Global – bilateral** e.g. **INF-Treaty, New START**
- **Regional – multilateral** e.g. **CFE-Treaty, Vienna Doc.**

# The Role of Arms Control for the European Security Order

## European Security Order

### Political Geography of „Europe“

- „Europe“ larger than European Union
- „Europe“: From the Atlantic to the Urals ?
- „European Security“ with USA & Soviet Union/Russia
- OSCE: „From Vancouver to Vladivostok“

### Institutions

- Organisation for Security and Cooperation on Europe (OSCE)
- NATO, European Union, Council of Europe
- CSTO, EEU (CIS)

### Norms & Standards

- Helsinki Final Act, Charter of Paris, European Security Charter
- Arms Control and CSBM

# The Role of Arms Control for the European Security Order

## European Security Order

### Phases of the European Security Order after 1945

- **Yalta division of Europe within bipolar world 1945-1989**
- **Détente and security cooperation within OSCE 1990 - ?**
  - **Collapse of Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union 1991**
  - **Eastern enlargement of NATO & European Union 1997+**
- **New Crises since 2007/2014**
- **Return of confrontation and mutual deterrence ?**

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# CSCE-Area 1973 - 1986



# Deterrence

## Definition

**Credible communication of**  
the **military capability** and the **political will**,  
to **defend** against a military **aggression successfully** or to  
inflict **incalculable and unacceptable damage** to the opponent,  
that would by far outweigh potential gains of an aggression,  
assuming that the opponent acts **reasonably**.

# Extended Deterrence

## Definition

Credible communication of  
the **military capability** and the **political will**,  
to **defend** against a military **aggression against allies**  
**collectively and successfully** or to  
inflict **incalculable and unacceptable damage** to the opponent,  
that would by far outweigh potential gains of an aggression,  
assuming that the opponent acts **reasonably**.

# Nuclear Deterrence

## Basic conditions of the Cold War (1)

- **Bipolar block confrontation**
  - two politico-military alliances
  - two military super powers (conventional / nuclear)
  - political, ideological, military confrontation
  - struggle for the „Third World“ („proxi wars“)
- **Division of Germany and Europe (Yalta)**
- Theaterwide warfighting strategies in Europe form mutual threat perceptions and force postures

# Nuclear Deterrence

## Basic conditions of the Cold War (2)

- Conventional superiority of NATO in Europe
- Concentration of forces in Germany / Central Europe
- High military preparedness – short warning time
- Geostrategic asymmetry in Europe
- Significance of nuclear escalation

# Deterrence during the Cold War

## Strategic Concepts and Force Postures

### **WP: large-scale offensive operations**

- Soviet-centric command structure
- High force concentration in GDR / Central Europe (Soviet Groups of Forces)
- Supporting role for non-Soviet WP forces
- Coherent land mass / strategic depth
- Soviet strategic echelons
- Fast attack operations in strategic directions
- Deep strikes against C<sup>3</sup>, Reserves & SLOCs
- **Integrated use of nuc + chem weapons**

### **NATO: integrated defence posture**

- Integrated command structure
- Integrated air defence
- Multinational stationing in FR Germany
- AMF for NATO's scattered periphery
- Small operational depth in FR Germany
- Depots for U.S. reinforcements
- Protection of Trans-Atlantic SLOCs
- Deep strikes against WP follow-on forces
- **Strategy of „Flexible Response“**

# Nuclear Deterrence

## Strategic Concepts and Force Postures

### *„Flexible Response“*

➤ **Forward Defence**

➤ **Deliberate Escalation**

*Selective (first) use of nuclear weapons*

➤ **General Nuclear Response**

# Nuclear Deterrence

## Nuclear Force Postures

### ➤ Strategic Nuclear Weapons

- „Triad“ (ICBM, SLBM, Strat Bomber)
- Second Strike Capability
- „Mutual Assured Destruction“ (MAD)
- high Reactivity / SIOP
- MIRV vs. ABM race

### ➤ “Euro-strategic” Nuclear Weapons

- Soviet MRBM, IRBM (SS-12, SS-4/5, SS-20)
- US/NATO ”dual track” (Pershing-II, GLCM)

### ➤ Sub-strategic („tactical“) Nuclear Waffen (TNW)

*„Credible extended deterrence“:*

- Forward stationing of TNW
- Nuclear sharing
- Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM Sergeant, Lance)
- Short-to-medium-range ballistic missiles (Pershing Ia)
- „Dual use“-delivery systems (Arty, FBA, SAM, ASW)



# Nuclear Deterrence

## Nuclear Dilemma

- **Strategic escalation irrational (MAD)**
- **Deliberate escalation with military impact**
  - Objective: *Demonstration* of capability,
  - + to stop conventional attack (**denial**) and
  - + to continue escalation with unacceptable damage (**punishment**)
- **Battlefield use** (with tailored weapons?)
- **deep strikes**
  - + but only in **WP „Glacis“** (e.g. with Pershing 1a)
  - + **not against Soviet „sanctuary“**
  - + **no nuclear sharing for GLCM / Pershing II**

- **Credibility:**
  - Risk & burden sharing**
  - + **Forward stationing of TNW**
  - + **nuclear sharing**
- **Reciprocally incalculable risks**
- **Risk to destroy „battlefield Central-Europe“**
- **Flexible** reaction, i.e.
- **Preparation of all options results in approx. 7,000 TNW in NATO-Europe**

# Implementing Deterrence

## Signalling Alliance Solidarity and Resolve

➤ Communiqués and **deployment decisions** of NATO Council

➤ **Integrated defence structure**

- + Integrated command and control / allied HQs
- + Integrated air defence + standing naval operations
- + multinational stationing in FR Germany
- + AMF & host nation support for reinforcements
- + **Forward stationing of TNW and nuclear sharing**

➤ **High levels of training and readiness**

- + high level of active personnel – conscription
- + units fully equipped + materiel reserves
- + **frequent alert-, reinforcement-, deployment- and tactical / operational exercises**

➤ Mobilization capacity (Structural + personnel reserves, **CIMIC**)

# Dual Track to Maintain Stability

## Deterrence plus Dialogue and Arms Control

- **Defence + Détente = Security (NATO Harmel-Report 1968)**
- **German détente politics since 1969 („Ostverträge“)**
- **Nuclear arms control treaties since 1972 (SALT I/II, ABM)**
- **Conventional arms control negotiations since 1973 (MBFR)**
- **Dialogue and limited co-operation approach (CSCE 1973 ff)**

### **CSCE Final Act Helsinki 1975**

- **New crises: CSSR 1968, Afghanistan 1979, missile crisis and NATO's stationing decision 1979**

# European Security Order from 1990 onwards

## Principles

- **Helsinki Principles 1975 („Decalogue“)**
- **Security cooperation** replaces confrontation
- **Comprehensive and undivided security**  
*„from Vancouver to Vladivostok“*

- Strengthening of the **CSCE/OSCE** as the  
*„common house of Europe“*
- **Common Norms and standards**

- **Free choice of alliances**
- **Geopolitical and military restraint secured by**  
**arms control and CSBMs**

# European Security Order from 1990 onwards

## Key Documents

### Comprehensive and undivided Security

1990

**„Two plus Four“ - Treaty**

Solemn Declaration of NATO and WTO Member States

**Charter of Paris for a New Europe**

**INF Treaty + CFE Treaty**

**Vienna Document 1990**

Treaty on Open Skies 1992 (EIF 2002)

# INF-Treaty

„Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of Medium- and shorter-Range Missiles“ (Dec 1987)

**Subject and objectives: Withdrawal and elimination of all**

- Ground-launched **Ballistic Missiles** and **Cruise Missiles**
  - Medium-range = 1000 – 5500 Km
  - Shorter-range = 500 – 1000 Km
- **Ground-mobile launchers** for Ballistic / Cruise Missiles
- **Support structures and equipment**

**Unlimited subject to global prohibition:**

- **Stationing, possession, production, flight test / start**

**Exceptions:**

- **Tests of missile stages for other purposes – if launched from fixed launchers on test sites (max. 35 booster)**
- **Interceptors**

# CFE-Treaty

„Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe“ (Nov 1990/92)

## Objectives

- **Replacing military confrontation by peaceful cooperation**
- **thereby overcoming the division of Europe**
- **Eliminating capabilities for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe**
- **Secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels**
- **Eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security**
- **Combined (Eastern - Western) group ceilings not exceeding 40,000 BT, 60,000 ACV, 40,000 Arty, 13,600 CbtA/C, 4,000 AH**

# CFE-Treaty


**„Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe“ (Nov 1990/92)**

## Main provisions of the CFE Treaty

- **Area of Application: From the Atlantic to the Urals (- SE-Turkey)**
- **5 categories of armaments & equipment limited by the treaty**
- **Further CAEST subject to transparency and verification**
- **Collective (Eastern - Western) group ceilings not exceeding 20,000 BT, 30,000 ACV, 20,000 Arty, 6,800 CbtA/C, 2,000 AH**
- **Regional limitations: TLE sub-ceilings in defined regions**
- **Readiness limitations: TLE sub-ceilings for active units**
- **Large reduction requirements, in particular SU + Germany**
- **Intrusive information and verification incl. on-site inspections**

# CFE & VD Areas of Application 1990/91

## Territorial Conflicts



# CFE & VD Areas of Application 1991/92

+ USA  
+ CAN

Geopolitical Changes  
CFE-Treaty enters into force

2.692 INF systems destroyed  
+ Presidential Nuclear Initiatives


-  Eastern Group of CFE S.P. split
-  Western Group of CFE S.P.
-  + other VD 90/92 p.S.
-  Former Yugoslavia

Russian force withdrawal  
1991-1994


No Stationing of  
foreign forces

20,000 Battle tanks  
30,000 Armoured combat veh.  
20,000 Artillery systems  
6,800 Combat aircraft  
2,000 Attack helicopters

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# NATO Enlargement vs CFE Force Balance



# European Security Order past 1996

## NATO Enlargement

### NATO-Russia Cooperation

#### NATO Russia Founding Act 1997

##### ➤ Strategic Restraint:

- No additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces
- **No forward stationing of nuclear weapons**
- Adaptation of the (block-related) CFE Treaty

##### ➤ **Strengthening of the OSCE**

#### NATO-Russia Council (Rome 2002)


- Close security cooperation without block positions,  
*inter alia* arms control and missile defence

# CFE, VD & DPA Areas of Application 1999

+ USA  
+ KAN

No additional permanent  
stationing of substantial  
combat forces (land/air)

rebus sic stantibus.



# European Security Order 1999 Adaptation

## Comprehensive undivided Security

1990

CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe

**CFE Treaty**

Vienna Document 90

## Adaptation 1999

OSCE Charter for European Security

**CFE-Adaptation Agreement (ACFE)**

Vienna Document 99

# Cooperative Security Order in Europe

## OSCE Charter for European Security


- **Common and indivisible security space without zones of different levels of security** (Charter, No. 1)
- **Equal security, free choice of alliances or neutrality**
- OSCE pS will *„not strengthen their security at the expense of other States.“* (Charter, II. No. 8)
- *„No State, group of States or organization can have any pre-eminent responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in the OSCE area ...“*
- *or consider any part of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.“* (Charter, II. No. 8)

# Cooperative European Security Order

## Concept of CFE Adaptation Agreement


- Replacement of bipolar balance of forces between two blocs by multilateral (sub-)regional stability
  - Prevention of destabilising force concentrations
- Replacement of regional group limitations by national & territorial TLE-ceilings for every States Party

- Opening of the (A)CFE-Treaty for accession by other states in the area of application (ATTU)



Common OSCE space of undivided, equal security

# Adapted CFE Limitation Regime



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# **European Security Order past 2001 New Conflict Potential**

**ACFE: NATO rejects ratification; Russia suspends CFE-Treaty 2007**

**Territorial conflicts (Kosovo, Georgia, Moldova)**

**Dispute on (non-cooperative) NATO enlargement**

**Role of OSCE, NATO, EU in the European Security Order**

**Strategic Missile Defence & conventional PGM**

**Military interventions outside Europe (Iraq, Libya etc)**

**2008: UDI Kosovo, Bucharest Summit, War in Georgia**

# European Security Order past 2009

## Success & Failure of the „Reset-Policy“

### Cooperation

- New START (2010) & Nuclear Security
- CW-Withdrawal from Syria (2013)
- Nonproliferation, Iran-Deal (2016)
- Fight against Terrorism (IS, Al-Qaeda)
- Afghanistan

### NATO Strategic Concept Lisbon 2010

- Cooperation
- Defence (EPAA)
- Crisis management beyond Article 5
- „Open Door“

### Unresolved conflicts

- European Security Order
- NATO-Enlargement vs. OSCE
- Conventional Arms Control
- Strategic Missile Defence
- Interventions, Principles, Values

### Since 2014: A New Cold War ?

- Russian Intervention in Ukraine
- New Threat Perceptions
- NATO's Military Reassurance Policy
- Mediation by „Normandy Group“
- OSCE Crisis Management / SMM

# Ukraine Conflict 2014/19





# NATO Summit Decisions Wales 2014, Warsaw 2016


➤ **Airpolicing, area monitoring, chain-exercises**

➤ **Rapid Reaction Forces (Readiness Action Plan)**  
+ **NATO Response Force 40,000 in 30 days**  
+ **VJTF (Land) 5,000 in 2-7 Tagen**  
+ **Preparation in deployment areas (HQs, Logistics, Infrastructure)**

➤ **„Enhanced Forward Presence“ (Rotation)**  
+ **4 multinational battle groups à ~ 1.100 Pers**  
in Estonia (UK), Latvia (CAN), Lithuania (DEU), Poland (US)  
+ **1 Multinational training brigade in Romania**

➤ **US European Reassurance Initiative (Rotation)**  
+ **1 Mechanized Brigade (approx. 4,000 Pers)**  
+ **Rotation (*Atlantic Resolve*: 87 BT, 144 ACV, 419 AV, 18 SPH)**  
+ **In Depots: Armaments & Equipment for 1 Brigade**

# Reaction by NATO 2014/18



**Summit Decisions**  
- Brussels July 2018  
*Enhanced Forward Presence*  
*Defense - Deterrence - Dialogue*

**4 Battle Grps (à 1,100)**  
**UK, CAN, DEU, USA**  
**2 x 4 NFU**

**Area monitoring**  
**Air Policing**  
**Chain Exercises**

**1 US Brigade**  
**Depots in DE, BE, NL**  
**Air defence in POL**

**Readiness Action Plan**  
**NRF+ 40,000, 30 Tage**  
**VJTF 5,000, 2-7 Tage**  
**30 combat batt.**  
**30 combat squads,**  
**30 combat vessels**  
**in 30 days each**

**1 multinational Brigade**  
**(Training)**  
**2 x 4 NFU**

# Return of deterrence: A new Cold War?

## *Situation in Cold War*

- **Bipolar block confrontation**
  - two politico-military alliances
  - two military super powers
  - political-ideological-military confrontation
  - Struggle for the 3rd world („*proxi wars*“)
- **Division of Germany / Europe (Yalta)**
- **War fighting strategies & force postures for large-scale high-intensity war**

## *Situation today*

- **Great power competition**
  - Russia without glacis in Europe
  - USA still dominant world power
  - Regional order conflict driven by global geopolitics
  - Hybrid interventions („*Regime change*“)
- **Focus on post-Sovjet. sphere**
- **Subregional power projection**

- **Conventional superiority by WTO**
- **Force concentration in Central Europa**
- **High readiness / short warning time**
- **Geostrategic asymmetry in Europe**
- **Comprehensive nuclear posture (10,000 TNW)**

- **Convent. superiority by NATO**
- **Force demonstration at periphery**
- **Scaled readiness of selected units**
- **Regional geostrat. asymmetrie**
- **Residual nuc forward deployment**

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# CFE & VD Areas of Application

Areas of limited transparency/  
without effective limitations


+ USA  
+ CAN

No ACFE  
ratification  
by NATO

ACFE ratif. 2004  
CFE susp. 2007

- Eastern Group of CFE S.P.
- GUAM
- NATO + CFE S.P.
- Western Group of CFE S.P.
- Non-CFE / NATO S.P.
- + other VD 90/92 pS
- Dayton DPA Art IV

OS



# INF-Treaty

## Mutual Accusations of Violating the INF-Treaty


### USA against Russian Federation:

- Informal since 2008, publicly since 2014
- **Development & Flight Tests of GLCM 9M729 / SSC-8**  
assumed range: 2600 km
- **Stationing in 2018 of 2 groups** (Kap. Yar, Yekaterinburg)
- **Stationing in 2019: + 2 groups** (also West of the Urals)
- **Sources classified ! – No cooperative verification !**

### Russian Federation against USA:

- Publicly since 2014
- **Testing of missile defence with INF-GLBM**
- **Introduction of strategic combat drones = INF-GLCM**
- **Aegis Ashore in Romania (+Poland 2020) with Mk-41 SLCM-Launcher – could be used as GLCM-Launcher**

# OSCE-Area 2014/19



# INF-Treaty

**„Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of Medium- and shorter-Range Missiles“ (Dec 1987)**

## **Verification 1988 - 2001**

- **On-site inspections**
  - in the U.S. and the Sovjet Union / Russian Fed.
  - in stationing countries (Germany, CSSR)
- **Verification of destruction of existing systems, supporting infrastructure and equipment**
- **Camera observation of produktion facilities**
- **Satellite observation**
- **End of on-site inspections May 2001**

## **Consultation body**

- **Special Verification Commission**

# INF-Treaty

## Chronology of withdrawal (1)

**11/12.07.2018 NATO Summit Brussels:**

- Commitment to maintain the INF-Treaty
- *Doubts* about Russia's compliance
- Russias's intransparency as to 9M729 criticized:
- No credible explanation
- Violation of treaty most plausible assessment

**20.10.2018** Trump announces withdrawal from INF-Treaty without prior consultations of allies

**Justification:** - **Treaty violation by Russia**  
- **Large INF-arsenals of China**

**04.12.2018** NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting in Brussels:

- support for U.S. assessment, that Russia is in material breach of the INF-Treaty

# INF-Treaty

## Chronology of Withdrawal (2)

**06.12.2018** AM Pompeo announces 60-days ultimatum:  
- Russia to destroy all 9M729 (SSC-8) or  
- U.S. will terminate INF-Treaty

**06.12.2018** Putin: U.S. wants to develop new weapons  
Russia will respond reciprocally  
Gerassimov: INF stationing countries will become potential targets

**15.01.2019** Bilateral meeting without cooperative solution

**23.01.2019** Russia demonstrates 9M729 in Kubinka to MilAtt

**25.01.2019** NATO-Russia-Council meeting: no agreement

**01.02.2019** U.S. announces withdrawal – and new arms projects

**02.02.2019** Russia announces withdrawal – and new arms projects

# INF-Treaty

## Chronology of Withdrawal (3)

**01.08.2019** USA announces end of INF-Treaty on 2 August 2019  
Russia follows suit

**02.08.2019** U.S. SecDef: development of conventional INF

**02.08.2019** NATO SecGen rejects Russian moratorium proposal

**06.08.2019** U.S. SecDef: plans to station GLCM in Asia-Pacific

**16.08.2019** Australia: U.S. stationing not under consideration

**18.08.2019** U.S. tests GLCM from San Nicholas Island off the coast of California using a Mk-41 VLS

**19.09.2019** President Putin proposes stationing moratorium

**03.11.2019** China condemns U.S. stationing plans in Pacific

# INF-Treaty

## Military Added Value of ground-launched INF

- **SLCM / ALCM – used in conventional role**
  - Equal precision – range – penetration capability
  - **Dual use – signature problem**
- **Regional concentration of land-based BM**
  - **China** – South Asia – Middle East
- **Reactivity, dispersal/camouflage, survivability?**
- **Employment from protected spaces ?**
- **Lower production cost / mass availability ?**
- **A new nuclear de-coupling ?**

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# INF-Treaty

## Options after the End of the INF-Treaty

- **Cooperative solutions**
  - Revitalising + modifying verification
  - Technical-telemetric **data exchange**
  - **Reciprocal** on-site inspections / flight demonstrations
  - Additional technical protocols to define „**standard design**“
  - **Multilateral** OSI + Open Skies observation flights
- **Tri-/multilateral succession treaty ? - China ?**

# INF-Treaty

## Options after the End of the INF-Treaty

### ➤ **Tri-/multilateral succession treaty ? Role of China**

- **China stations approx. 1,600 (+) land-based medium-range missiles**
- **mainly at East- / South China Sea (E/SCS) coast, 90 % with INF-ranges**
- **Role: A2/AD of E/SCS approaches, no capability to reach U.S. mainland**

- **China possesses approx. 290 nuclear warheads**
- **focus on strategic deterrence (counter value - „no first use“ policy)**
- **China's nuclear capability similar to that of France (300) and UK (220)**

- **U.S. implements extended deterrence in Asia-Pacific with SLCM /ALCM**
- **U.S./RUS possess more than 6,000 warheads (~ 2,400-3,000 deployed)**

- **Representative of ChMFA rejects accession to INF, Berlin 15.03.2019**


- **China Daily of 03 Nov 2019 condemns U.S. search for INF-bases in Asia-Pacific and warns that China would react appropriately**

# INF-Treaty

## Options after the End of the INF-Treaty

- **Cooperative solutions**
  - Revitalising + modifying verification
  - Technical-telemetric **data exchange**
  - **Reciprokal** on-site inspections / flight demonstrations
  - Additional technical protocols to define „**standard design**“
  - **Multilateral** OSI + Open Skies observation flights
- **Tri-/multilateral succession treaty ? - China ?**
- **Parallel signals: no INF-stationing in Europe**
- **Strengthening global non-proliferation**
- **Flexible New START II with enlarged scope**

# Crisis Reaction of OSCE 2014/19



# OSCE „Structured Dialogue“

## Threat Perceptions

Intentions

Military capabilities

Force postures

Military activities

Incident prevention

## Foundations of European Security Order

Principles

Treaties, Agreements

Military Contacts, OSCE Communication Network

# **The Role of Arms Control for the European Security Order**

**– Erosion of Arms Control Arrangements –  
Can this Trend be Reversed?**

*Thank you ! Questions ?*

Wolfgang Richter  
Colonel (ret.)  
Senior Associate

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik  
Berlin

# Abkürzungsverzeichnis

A2/AD	Anti-access/area denial	CW	Chemical Weapons	OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile	CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention	PGM	Precision-Guided Munition
A(C)V	Armoured (Combat) Vehicles	DE/DEU	Deutschland / Germany	POL	Poland
ACFE	Adapted CFE Treaty	DPA	Dayton Peace Accord	PTBT	Partial Test-Ban Treaty
AH	Attack Helicopter	EEU	Eurasian Economic Union	RBSF	Russian Black Sea Fleet
ALCM	Air-launched Cruise Missile	EIF	Entry into Force	RRF	Rapid Reaction Forces
Arty	Artillery	EPAA	European Phased Adaptive Approach	RUS	Russian Federation
ASW	Anti-Submarine Weapons	ECS	East China Sea	SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty
ATTU	From Atlantic to the Urals	EU	European Union	SAM	Surface-to-Air Missiles
BE	Belgium	FBA	Fighter Bomber Attack	SCS	South China Sea
BT	Battle Tank	GDR	German Democratic Republic	SecDef	U.S. Secretary of Defense
BTWC	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention	GLBM	Ground-launched Ballistic Missile	SecGen	(NATO) Secretary General
C <sup>3</sup>	Command, control, communications	GLCM	Ground-launched Cruise Missile	SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
CAEST	Conventional Armament & Equipment Subject to the Treaty	GUAM	Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova	SLBM	Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile
CAN	Canada	HQ	Headquarters	SLCM	Sea-launched Cruise Missile
CbtA/C	Combat Aircraft	ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile	SLOC	Sea-lines of Communication
CCW	UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons	INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces	SMM	(OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe	IRBM	Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile	SORT	Strategic Offensive Arms Reductions Treaty
ChMFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China	IS	Islamic State	S.P.	State Party (to a treaty)
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation	JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action	SPH	Self-propelled Howitzer
CIS	Community of Independent States	MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction	SRBM	Short-range Ballistic Missile
CSBM	Confidence and Security-Building Measures	MBFR	Mutual Balanced Forces Reductions	SSR	Socialist Soviet Republic
CSCE	Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe	MilAtt	Military Attaché	START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
CSSR	Czechoslovak Socialist Republic	MIRV	Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle	StratEchel	Strategic Echelon
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization	Mk-41 VLS	Type of US Vertical Launch System	StratRes	Strategic Reserve
CTBT	Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty	MRBM	Medium-Range Ballistic Missile	SU	Soviet Union
		NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	TLE	Treaty-limited Armament & Equipment
		NFIU	NATO Force Integration Unit	TNW	Tactical Nuclear Weapons
		NL	Netherlands	TPNW	Treaty on the Prohibition of NW
		NPT	Treaty on Non-Proliferation of NW	UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
		NRF	NATO Response Force	UK	United Kingdom
		NW	Nuclear Weapons	VD	Vienna Document
		OSI	On-site Inspection	VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
		OS (T)	(Treaty on) Open Skies	WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction